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In this paper we study equilibrium and experimental bidding
behaviour in ﬁrst-price and second-price auctions with outside
options.
We ﬁnd that bidders do respond to outside options and to
variations of common knowledge about competitors’ outside
options. However, overbidding in ﬁrst-price auctions is signiﬁ-
cantly higher with outside options than without. First-price
auctions yield more revenue than second-price auctions. This
revenue-premium is signiﬁcantly higher with outside options. In
second-price auctions the introduction of outside options has only
a small effect.
& 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
During the last decade, auctions have increasingly attracted attention from academia and the
wider public. A major part of this increased interest is due to growing popularity of auctions as
market institutions for consumer-to-consumer and business-to-consumer transactions, allocating
public resources and procurement contracts. Cases in point are worldwide spectrum auctions, online
auction platforms such as eBay and Ricardo and virtual business-to-business market places, e.g.
Covisint for the automotive industry or Consip’s AiR for Italian public procurement offers.
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ﬁrst-price auction. European Economic Review (2008), doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.03.005Typically outside options are available to bidders in addition to the object offered in the particular
auction. For example, consider the ﬁerce bidding war of the software giants Oracle and SAP in 2005
to acquire Retek, a developer of specialised software for retailing ﬁrms. The ‘‘object’’ in this takeover
auction, Retek, offered both ﬁrms the opportunity to acquire specialised software and an established
customer base. Clearly, both bidders faced the outside option to develop software and build up a
customer base independent of the takeover. In fact, the unsuccessful bidder SAP announced in a press
release on 22 March 2005 that it precisely plans to follow that outside option after revealing its
unwillingness to continue bidding.
Sequential sales of similar products constitute another example for outside options.
Bidders in the ﬁrst sale know that they have the option to bid for the product also in the second
sale.
In this paper we augment the standard symmetric independent private value (SIPV) model to
allow for public and private outside options. We derive equilibrium bidding functions and implement
the auction in the laboratory.
To our knowledge, there is no literature systematically inquiring the effects of outside options in
auctions other than Cherry et al. (2004).
1 We show that a model with jointly distributed private
values and outside options can be reduced to a standard SIPV model.
2 One special case is analysed by
Holt (1980) who assumes that valuations are constant and the same for all bidders. A related case is
examined by Weber (1983), Gale and Hausch (1994), and Reiß and Scho ¨ndube (2007) who study
sequential auction models: A subsequent auction in such a sequential auction process can be
interpreted as a speciﬁc outside option whose value is endogenously determined. Brosig and Reiß
(2007) demonstrate that bidders’ behaviour in a prior auction is affected by a subsequent ﬁrst-price
procurement auction. In their complex outside option model, the expected option value depends on
beliefs about other bidders’ entry behaviour, their bidding behaviour in future auctions and the
cognitive abilities to assess the outside option value given beliefs. In contrast, in our paper we isolate
the effects of exogenous outside option values from other factors and systematically investigate their
impact on allocative efﬁciency, seller’s revenue, and bidders’ behaviour in ﬁrst-price and second-
price auctions.
In particular, in our experiments we want to ﬁnd out the following for the ﬁrst-price and the
second-price auction:
  Do exogenous outside options affect bids at all?
  Do bids in the laboratory deviate from equilibrium bids in the same way as they deviate in
standard auctions without outside options?
  How are revenue and efﬁciency affected if outside options are present?
The plan of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we introduce outside options into the SIPV
auction model and derive equilibrium bidding strategies for the ﬁrst-price and second-price
auctions, Section 3 describes our experimental design, Section 4 provides experimental results and
Section 5 concludes.
2. The SIPVs auction model with outside options
There are n risk neutral individuals with single-object-demand. Each individual i has a valuation
vi for an object that is for sale in an auction. In addition to the auction offer each individual has access
to an outside option that can be substituted for the object offered in the auction. The value that an
individual derives from exerting the outside option and not receiving the auctioned object is denoted
ARTICLE IN PRESS
1 Cherry et al. (2004) inquire into the value of laboratory testbed markets regarding ﬁeld applications. They note that one
difference between laboratory and ﬁeld is the possibility of substitutes in the latter. To test the robustness of the testbed
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2 In particular, our theoretical analysis will include the case of correlated values and outside options. See Section 2.3.
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3 We assume here that receiving the auctioned object eliminates the value of the outside option
entirely. Individuals may exert their outside options before, during or after the auction.
We distinguish between public and private outside options. In the case of public outside options,
each individual derives the same beneﬁt from the outside option. This is common knowledge. In
contrast, private outside options are individual-speciﬁc and private information.
We brieﬂy report equilibrium bidding functions for ﬁrst-price and second-price auction in the
SIPV model in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2 we introduce public outside options. In Section 2.3 we
extend the SIPV model to allow for private outside options.
2.1. Bidding without outside options
Consider ﬁrst the case of an object which has individual valuation vi for each bidder i. This
valuation is private information and independently and identically distributed according to a
cumulative distribution function FðviÞ where vi 2½ v; ¯ v . Without outside options, the symmetric risk
neutral Bayes–Nash equilibrium bidding functions for the ﬁrst- and second-price auctions are well






n 1ðvÞ and for the second-price auction b
spðvÞ¼v.
2.2. Public outside options
As in Section 2.1 individual i has a valuation vi for the auctioned object. Now, however, individual i
can also exert the public outside option and obtain a value w which is, in the case of a public outside
option, the same across all individuals. We assume wpv. This ensures that every individual
voluntarily participates in a standard auction.
We will use the payoff equivalence theorem to derive the equilibrium bidding function.
4 From the
bidder’s perspective the auction with public outside options can be interpreted as a standard auction
where bidders who fail to win the object receive a payment of w, thus, the application of the payoff
equivalence theorem is possible.
Following Riley and Samuelson (1981), let Pðx;vÞ be the expected payoff that a representative
bidder with valuation v receives if mimicking valuation x, provided that all competitors adhere to the
common equilibrium bidding strategy b
fp-pbðÞ. The superscript indicates the auction format (fp for
ﬁrst-price auction) and the type of outside option (pb for public outside options). From payment
equivalence without auction reserve price (cf. Riley and Samuelson,1981, Eqs. (7) and (8)), we obtain
immediately the expected equilibrium payment of the representative bidder with valuation v. This






n 1ðxÞdx   Pðv;vÞ. (1)
For a bidder with the lowest valuation to be indifferent between participating and not participating
in the auction, the bidder must receive at least the outside option w in the auction. This yields the
condition Pðv;vÞ¼w. For the ﬁrst-price design with the modiﬁcation that each unsuccessful bidder
receives w the expected equilibrium payment is given by
PðvÞ¼F
n 1ðvÞb
fp-pbðvÞ ½ 1   F
n 1ðvÞ w. (2)
Combining both expressions for expected equilibrium payment, (1) and (2), and solving for b
fp-pbðvÞ
leads to the intuitive result that the equilibrium bid under the ﬁrst-price design with public outside
ARTICLE IN PRESS
3 Valuations of transaction alternatives are net of transaction costs. If, for instance, an alternative object is offered at a
posted price, then wi represents the value of the outside option net of its price. If there are many alternatives, then wi
corresponds to the best alternative net of prices.
4 Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) derived the payoff equivalence theorem in auction theory. According to
the theorem the expected revenue of an auction seller and the expected payoffs of risk neutral bidders in Bayes–Nash
equilibrium are invariant within a large class of auction formats encompassing ﬁrst-price and second-price auction.
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fpðvÞ is the equilibrium bidding function in the ﬁrst-price auction without outside options as
deﬁned in Section 2.1.
The weakly dominant bidding strategy
5 for the second-price auction is
b
sp-pbðv;wÞ¼v   w. (4)
Since b
fp-pb and b
sp-pb are monotonic in v the allocation in equilibrium is always efﬁcient in the
public outside options case.
2.3. Private outside options
The valuation of individual i is, again, vi. The value from exerting the outside option is wi.
Valuation pairs ðv;wÞ2½ v; ¯ v  ½ w; ¯ w  are independently distributed across individuals according to
the probability density function fðv;wÞ and are their private information. The joint distribution fðv;wÞ
allows for correlations between valuation and outside option. Again we assume that no outside
option w is larger than the lowest valuation v, i.e. ¯ wpv. This ensures that each individual will
participate in the auction.
2.3.1. Equilibrium bidding: First-price auction
In order to derive the equilibrium bidding strategy in the ﬁrst-price auction, we represent the
bidding model such that we can employ the payoff equivalence theorem. Its application to the case of
private outside options is not trivial since interpreting the outside option as an auctioneer’s payment
to unsuccessful bidders implies bidder-speciﬁc payments. This would violate the theorem’s
assumption of anonymity which requires allocation and payment rules to depend only on submitted
bids and not on other individual characteristics. We, therefore, reduce the two-dimensional bidder’s
type ðv;wÞ, to a single-dimensional type x:¼v   w.
Consider the utility maximisation problem of the representative risk neutral individual i that
submits bid bi in some auction satisfying payoff equivalence (cf. Riley and Samuelson, 1981). Let
individual i face outside option wi and denote the bidder’s expected payment according to the
auction rules by Pð Þ where Pð Þ depends on all submitted bids:
max
bi
P ¼ PrðbiwinsÞ vi   Pðb1;...;bnÞþ½ 1   PrðbiwinsÞ    wi.
This program can be rearranged to
max
bi
P ¼ PrðbiwinsÞ ð vi   wiÞ Pðb1;...;bnÞþwi. (5)
Since the outside option wi is known to the individual and a constant we can drop wi. Furthermore,
we replace vi   wi by xi.
max
bi
e P ¼ PrðbiwinsÞ xi   Pðb1;...;bnÞ (6)
We interpret x 2½ v  ¯ w; ¯ v   w  as an individual’s net valuation of the object. One way to view the
transformation of the original maximisation problem into (6) is to suppose that the representative
individual exerts the outside option wi before bidding in the auction, and, in case the auction is won
(since we have single-object-demand) repays the value of the outside option.
We have now a standard bidding problem with net valuation x. Next, we identify the probability
density function of net valuations. Note that inﬁnitely many valuation pairs ðv;wÞ lead to the same
net valuation x. The probability density of a given net valuation x is obtained by summing up all
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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f XðxÞ¼
Z minf ¯ w;¯ v xg
maxfw;v xg
fðx þ w;wÞdw, (7)
where f XðxÞ is the probability density function of net valuations and FXðxÞ the associated cumulative
distribution function. Similar to the case of public outside options (see Eq. (1)) we obtain the








X ðyÞdy   e Pðx;xÞ. (8)
For the marginal bidder with the lowest net valuation x to be indifferent between participating and
not participating in the auction, the bidder must receive the outside option in the auction. Since, for
any net valuation x we have P ¼ e P þ wi by the above transformation it follows e Pðx;xÞ¼0. Hence, for





where the superscript fp-pr indicates the case of a ﬁrst-price auction (fp) with private outside
options (pr). Combining both expressions for expected equilibrium payment, (8) and (9), solving for
b
fp-prð Þ, and substituting for net valuations leads to the equilibrium bidding function:
b
fp-prðv;wÞ¼v   w  
R v w





X ðv   wÞ
, (10)
which is strictly increasing in v and strictly decreasing in w since qb=qx40 and qx=qv ¼  qx=qw ¼ 1.
As a special case, let us now derive the equilibrium bidding function for the parametrisation we
use in the experiment. Suppose n ¼ 2 and let valuation-outside option pairs ðv;wÞ be uniformly
distributed over the domain ½50;100  ½ 0;50 . The joint probability density function of ðv;wÞ





if x 2½ 0;50 ;
100   x
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if x 2½ 0;50 ;
200x   x2   5000
5000
if x 2½ 50;100 :
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x if x 2½ 0;50 ;
300x2   2x3   250000
600x   3x2   15000





The bidding function b
fp-prðxÞ is continuous and differentiable at x ¼ 50. b
fp-prðv;wÞ can be obtained
by substituting x ¼ v   w.
2.3.2. Equilibrium bidding: Second-price auction
For the second-price auction without outside options it can be shown with a standard argument
that bidding the own valuation in the auction is a weakly dominant strategy for each bidder.
Following a similar argument we also ﬁnd that bidding the own net valuation xi ¼ vi   wi is a weakly
dominant strategy in the second-price auction with outside options.
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Since bidding functions are monotonic in x the object is in equilibrium allocated to the bidder
with the highest net valuation. One can easily see that this leads to an efﬁcient allocation.
3. Experimental design and procedures
To test the theoretical implications of public and private outside options in the SIPV model, we use
ﬁve treatments in a between-subjects design. We vary the type of outside options (none/public/
private) and the auction design (ﬁrst price/second price). In Appendix A we summarise the treatment
parameters for each of the 19 experimental sessions. Three hundred and forty subjects participated
in the experiment. Sessions lasted for about 75min. The experiment was programmed and
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
3.1. Treatment types
We distinguish between three types of treatments: A, B, and C. In the baseline treatment, A, we
ran standard auction games without outside options and independent private values with two
bidders. Valuations were randomly drawn from a uniform distribution with support ½50;100  . In the
baseline treatment A we use either a ﬁrst-price auction (treatment A1) or a second-price auction
(treatment A2). There were neither minimum bids nor entry fees. Bids and valuations were
denominated in experimental currency units (ECU). In each experimental session twelve auction
rounds were played. We used a strangers-matching design such that no bidder was matched with the
same opponent in two consecutive rounds.
3.2. Strategy method
In standard auction experiments bidders ﬁrst learn their payoff-relevant valuation before they
submit a bid, e.g., Cox et al. (1982), Kagel and Levin (1993) or Ockenfels and Selten (2005). In our
experiment we use the strategy method to elicit continuous bidding functions. Fig.1 shows a typical
input screen. We ask participants to submit bids for six hypothetical valuations 50, 60, 70, 80, 90 and
100. Bids for intermediate valuations are interpolated linearly. The bidding function is displayed as a
graph at all times. Bidders can adjust their entered bids and, thus, their bid functions until they are
satisﬁed. Bids are entered via keyboard, they have to be non-negative, not larger than 200, and have
at most two decimal places. Only after all bids are submitted, values were drawn.
Related implementations of the strategy method have been used in a few other experiments.
Selten and Buchta (1999) introduced the strategy method for auction experiments. There bidders
could specify a piecewise linear bidding functions with up to 10 000 segments either using a
graphical input mode or via keyboard (valuations ranged between 0.00 and 100.00). The number of
possible segments in this setup was apparently too high: 46% of observed bidding functions were
non-monotonic—the authors observe that bidders drew landscapes rather than bidding functions (p.
81). Pezanis-Christou and Sadrieh (2004) used a highly simpliﬁed version of the Selten and Buchta
(1999) implementation. Bidders could specify only two segments. In their study, approximately 15%
of bidding functions are non-monotonic in their asymmetric auction treatments and approximately
5% in their symmetric auction treatments.
6 Gu ¨th et al. (2002, 2003) also use the strategy method,
though, with a much smaller set of only 11 possible valuations. For each of these eleven values,
bidders had to enter a corresponding value. Intermediate values, which were possible in Selten and
Buchta (1999), Pezanis-Christou and Sadrieh (2004), and in our experiment, were not possible in the
experiment of Gu ¨th et al.
Our experiment constitutes, thus, a compromise between the potentially highly complex bidding
function of Selten and Buchta (1999) and the simpler designs of Pezanis-Christou and Sadrieh (2004)
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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bidding functions with our interface: Only about 10.15% of all bids are not monotonic in our
experiment.
3.3. Multiple feedback and risk neutral equilibrium predictions
Another distinctive feature of our design is that pairs of matched bidders participated in ﬁve
unrelated auctions after speciﬁcation of their bidding schedules instead of one single auction. For
each of these ﬁve auctions and for each bidder a valuation was drawn independently from a uniform
distribution with support ½50;100 . In each of the ﬁve auctions, bids were determined according to
the speciﬁed bidding functions. One reason to do this is to decrease the random component in
income determination and to increase the strategic one. Kirchkamp et al. (2006) show that playing
several auctions simultaneously makes bidding functions in the experiment appear substantially
more risk neutral. Using risk neutral equilibria as reference points becomes, thus, more plausible. To
better understand whether multiple auctions also reduce risk averse behaviour in our experiment we
follow Isaac and James (2000) and infer for each subject the parameter of constant relative risk
aversion r from observed bids in our baseline treatment (A1). Risk neutral bidders are characterised
by r ¼ 1 and inﬁnitely risk averse bidders have an r ¼ 0. Isaac and James (2000) report for their
experiments where players play only single auctions an average of r ¼ 0:503. In our experiment the
sample average is with 0.821 substantially larger and closer to risk neutrality.
Another reason to play several auctions in our experiment is to make it more plausible that
participants have to submit an entire bidding function. For all ﬁve auctions, bidders were informed
about their valuations, their submitted bid, whether they won the object, the price of each object,
and their own income, see Fig. 2. They were also informed about their income for each round which
was the sum of the income in the ﬁve auctions. No information about competitor’s valuations and
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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Treatments B and C introduce outside options. The outside option is an exogenously given income
for the bidder who did not win the auction. The values of these outside options were drawn from a
uniform distribution with support ½0;50  and were held constant for four consecutive auction rounds.
Outside options were distributed independently of valuations to rule out incorrect statistical
inferences as a possible confounding factor since subjects in auction experiments do not always
correctly account for all statistical information available to them (cf. Brosig and Reiß, 2007). The
value of the outside option was announced to each individual bidder before they speciﬁed their
bidding functions. Treatments B and C differed in the amount of information bidders had about their
competitors’ outside options. In treatment B the outside option was public information and the same
for both bidders. In the C treatments outside options were drawn independently for each bidder from
a uniform distribution with support ½0;50 . In this treatment bidders knew their own outside option
but not the outside option of their opponent. We use ﬁrst-price auctions in treatments B1 and C1 and
a second-price auction in treatment C2. Table 1 summarises the number of independent observations
and the number of participants by treatment.
3.5. Matching groups
We get one independent observation per matching group. In 17 of 19 experimental sessions,
subjects were randomly divided into two matching groups consisting of either eight or 10 subjects
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Fig. 2. A typical feedback screen in the experiment (treatment A1, translated into English).
7 We have to make the transaction price public in the second-price auction since there the loser’s bid determines the
winner’s price. To be consistent, and in line with typical real-world markets, we make the transaction price also public in the
ﬁrst-price auction.
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8 In each of the two remaining
sessions, there was a single matching group with 14 subjects. The number of subjects varied slightly
over matching groups since in some sessions some participants did not show up. This, however, only
affected the size of the matching group (which was never smaller than eight). Auctions were always
played by two bidders.
3.6. Procedures
At the beginning of each experimental session, participants read written instructions,
then they took a brief treatment-speciﬁc computerised quiz to ensure their familiarity with the
instructions and the experiment. Afterwards they played 12 rounds of the actual experiment.
At the end of the last auction round, participants completed a brief computerised questionnaire
and received their earned income in cash. Since in treatments A1 and A2 participants
earned no income from outside options, they received an additional payment of 3 Euro in these
treatments.
3.7. Equilibrium predictions
Table 2 summarises the risk neutral Bayes–Nash equilibrium bidding strategies for the
different treatments. For all treatments, except for C1, the equilibrium bidding functions are
linear in v. Hence, in these treatments bidders can submit equilibrium bidding functions even
if they have to use a stepwise linear bidding function. In treatment C1 the equilibrium
bidding function is nonlinear and can only be approximated with a stepwise linear function.
However, one can show that the difference between an unrestricted equilibrium bid and a stepwise









A1 2½ 50;75 
B1 b
B1ðv;wÞ¼25 þ v
2   wb





3x if x 2½ 0;50 
100x2 2=3x3 250 000=3





C1 2½ 0;50 
where x   v   w
A2 b
A2ðvÞ¼vb
A2 2½ 50;100 
C2 b
C2ðv;wÞ¼x, where x   v   wb
C2 2½ 0;100 
Table 1
Number of independent observations and participants
Type of outside options First-price auction Second-price auction
None A1: 8 (86 participants) A2: 6 (58 participants)
Public B1: 6 (52 participants) –
Private C1: 8 (72 participants) C2: 8 (72 participants)
8 See Appendix A for the number of subjects in each experimental session.
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A summary of overbidding behaviour is shown in Fig. 3. The vertical axis shows for each of our
ﬁve different treatments the medians and the 25% and 75% quantiles of differences between actual
bids and equilibrium bids (see Table 2). The horizontal axis shows (for the different combinations of
valuations v and outside options w) the values of the equilibrium bids in this treatment. In the
treatments A1 and A2 this is a simple linear function of the valuation. For these treatments
valuations v are given in parentheses below the equilibrium bids.
We make two observations. One is standard: There is a substantial amount of overbidding in the
ﬁrst-price auction (A1) and a small amount of overbidding in the second-price auction (A2). In that
context we should note that the distribution of bids in the second-price auction is rather asymmetric.
Median bids and 25% quantile bids are very close to equilibrium. Only the right tail of the
distribution, the 75% quantile bids, show overbidding. The second observation is more interesting:
The amount of overbidding is larger in the treatments with outside options.
4.1. Treatment B1: Public outside options in the ﬁrst-price auction
To gain a better understanding of bidding behaviour we regress bids b on valuations v and outside
options w following Eq. (14) for treatments A1 and B1. Results are shown in Table 3.
b ¼ bvv þ bww þ b0 þ u. (14)
Since observations within a matching group of our experiments might be dependent we compare a
standard robust model with two mixed effect models. Both mixed effect models allow for two
sources of error, one associated with the speciﬁc matching group, the other with the individual
observation. The ﬁrst mixed effect model assumes that only the intercept is subject to a random
effect, the second mixed effect model assumes that all coefﬁcients are subject to a random effect.
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70 80 90 40 60 80
The vertical axis shows for each of our ﬁve different treatments the median (thick line) as well as 25% and 75%
quantiles (dashed lines) of the amount of overbidding, i.e. differences between actual bids and equilibrium bids
(see table 2).
The horizontal axis shows (for the different combinations of valuations v and outside options w) the values of the
equilibrium bids in this treatment. In the treatments A1 and A2 this is a simple linear function of the valuation.
For these treatments valuations v are given in parentheses below the equilibrium bids. Quantiles are based on six
bands with the same number of observations in each band.
Fig. 3. Overbidding: Medians and quantiles. Quantiles are based on six bands with the same number of observations in each
band.
9 For the mixed effect model we use R’s lme procedure with REML estimation. For the Wilcoxon test we estimate a linear
model for each independent matching group. We then use a standard one-sided Wilcoxon test to compare the vector of these
coefﬁcients with the equilibrium value.
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equilibrium values are also shown in Table 3.
We ﬁnd that the estimated coefﬁcient of the public outside option value w is in absolute terms
signiﬁcantly smaller than the equilibrium prediction bw ¼  1 . Also the coefﬁcient of the valuation v
is, as found in several other studies, signiﬁcantly larger in the experiment than the equilibrium
prediction bv ¼ 0:5.
The fact that bidders do not fully exploit their outside option is interesting in the light of the
debate on the declining price anomaly, i.e. the observation that prices for identical products which
are sold sequentially often follow a decreasing pattern.
10 If this exploitation failure arises with
endogenous outside options, too, then one might expect a series of falling prices as observed in the
ﬁeld since bids in the early auctions would be too high.
4.2. Treatment C1: Private outside options in ﬁrst-price auctions
In treatment C1 the equilibrium bidding function is not linear. We, thus, estimate the following
equation:
b ¼ bvv þ bww þ bDD þ b0 þ u, (15)
where D captures the nonlinearity and is deﬁned as
D   b
C1ðv   wÞ 2
3ðv   wÞ. (16)
We should note that D is zero for the linear part of the bidding function (where ðv   wÞ2½ 0;50 ). In
that range the equilibrium bidding function is just 2
3ðv   wÞ (see Eq. (13)). For the non-linear part of
the bidding function (where ðv   wÞ2½ 50;100 ) the equilibrium bid is just the sum of 2
3ðv   wÞ and D.
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Table 3
Estimation of Eq. (14) for the A1 and B1 treatment
b






















const. 25.0 0.0039  0.1155 0.525 0.0000 0.0348 0.836 1.895 0.0000 0.3630 2.008 5.497 0.0000





2 ¼ 0:7374 AIC ¼ 44425:2562 AIC ¼ 44372:4140
B1
const. 25.0 0.0156 1.8716 0.941 0.0000 3.1076 1.238 1.500 0.0000 4.0864 1.528 2.539 0.0000
v 0.5 0.0156 0.7965 0.013 0.0000 0.7965 0.012 0.0000 0.7962 0.013 0.013 0.0000





2 ¼ 0:6281 AIC ¼ 29727:8468 AIC ¼ 29733:6608
The table reports estimated ﬁxed effects ^ b
fix:
eff: with their estimated standard deviation ^ s
fix:
b . For the mixed models the table also
includes the estimated standard deviation of the random effects ^ s
rand:
grp: and the estimated residual standard deviation ^ s
rand:
res: .
P-values are for tests against the equilibrium values of the coefﬁcients. As a measure of ﬁt the standard robust effect model
includes R
2 and the mixed effect model Akaike’s Information Criterion AIC. The third column shows p-values for a Wilcoxon
test against the equilibrium values b
eq: (see footnote 9).
10 See Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003) and the references therein. For the theoretical reference solution, see Weber (1983);
for an experimental study that reproduces this phenomenon in the laboratory, see Keser and Olson (1996).
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3, bw ¼ 2
3, bD ¼ 1.
However, a bidder who follows the linear part of the equilibrium bidding function 2
3ðv   wÞ over the
entire range of possible valuations and outside options will still have a bv ¼ 2
3, bw ¼ 2
3 but a bD ¼ 0.
Table 4 summarises the regression results. We see that estimates for bv and bw are signiﬁcantly
larger in absolute terms than they should be in equilibrium. The coefﬁcient bD has the
correct sign, i.e. bidders do pick up the nonlinearity. However, bD is signiﬁcantly smaller than its
equilibrium value. bv is larger in absolute terms than bw, though not signiﬁcantly so (F1;7 ¼ 2:82,
p ¼ 0:1370).
The regression results show that in the ﬁrst-price auction with private outside options bidders
react slightly too sensitively to their own valuation v. This is consistent with the case of no outside
options and leads to some overbidding. Bidders also reduce their bids according to their outside
options almost as they should in equilibrium. In addition to the so far ‘‘standard’’ overbidding,
bidders also forget to shade their bids when v is large and w is small. The nonlinearity in the
equilibrium bidding function which lowers equilibrium bids is only to a small degree reﬂected in the
experimental bidding function.
4.3. Treatment A2 and C2: Second-price auctions
For the second-price auction we again estimate Eq. (14). Results are reported in Table 5. The bv
coefﬁcients in both treatments are not signiﬁcantly different from each other (F1;13 ¼ 2:28,
p ¼ 0:1549).
11 Also, coefﬁcients are close to equilibrium values, though in the C2 treatment bv is
(in absolute terms) signiﬁcantly smaller than bw (F1;7 ¼ 7:29, p ¼ 0:0307).
Most importantly, the coefﬁcient for the outside option value bw is estimated, depending on the
model, to be somewhere between 0.96 and 0.97, thus, very close to the equilibrium value bw ¼ 1 and
not signiﬁcantly different. It appears that bidders on average fully exploit their outside option in the
second-price auction, although they failed to do so in ﬁrst-price auctions. Recall that in treatment B1
bids decrease only by 0.77 to 0.87 (again, the estimation depends on the model) per unit of outside
option value instead of 1.00.
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Table 4
Estimation of Eq. (15) for the C1 treatment
C1 b





















const. 0.0000 0.2734  1.6588 0.833 0.0466  1.2863 1.002 1.908 0.1992  2.0381 2.919 7.990 0.4850
v 0.6667 0.0078 0.8056 0.013 0.0000 0.8059 0.011 0.0000 0.8122 0.035 0.093 0.0000
w  0.6667 0.0742  0.7202 0.012 0.0000  0.7337 0.013 0.0000  0.7286 0.030 0.077 0.0402





2 ¼ 0:7141 AIC ¼ 39075:3903 AIC ¼ 38944:2364
The table reports estimated ﬁxed effects ^ b
fix:
eff: with their estimated standard deviation ^ s
fix:
b . For the mixed models the table also
includes the estimated standard deviation of the random effects ^ s
rand:
grp: and the estimated residual standard deviation ^ s
rand:
res: .
P-values are for tests against the equilibrium values of the coefﬁcients. As a measure of ﬁt the standard robust effect model
includes R
2 and the mixed effect model Akaike’s Information Criterion AIC. The third column shows p-values for a Wilcoxon
test against the equilibrium values b
eq: (see footnote 9).
11 For this, as well as for all other test statistics given in the text, we use Rogers’ (1993) procedure that takes into
account that observations might be correlated within matching groups but not across matching groups. Standard errors
with this procedure are usually more conservative than those of either the standard robust model or the mixed effect
models.
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To further test whether outside options are taken into account, i.e. whether bids are larger with
outside options than without, we compare average bids from the A1 and the B1 treatment. For each
of the six valuations and 12 rounds we compare the mean bids for each independent observation in
the A1 and B1 treatment with a Mann–Whitney U test. If bidders would disregard outside options
the test should ﬁnd only a small number of signiﬁcant differences of mean bids among the two
treatments. However, bids with public outside options are signiﬁcantly larger in all 72 cases
(po0:015, two-tailed). We also compare the A1 and C1 treatment using the same procedure. Again,
in all 72 comparisons average bids are signiﬁcantly larger with outside options than without
(po0:0008, two-tailed). Also in a comparison of the A2 and C2 treatment in all 72 comparisons
average bids are signiﬁcantly larger (po0:003, two-tailed).
4.5. Outside options increase overbidding in ﬁrst-price auctions








3ðv   wÞþbDD þ u. (17)
b
eq
A is the equilibrium bid in the ﬁrst-price auction without outside options and zero otherwise. b
eq
B is
the equilibrium bid in the ﬁrst-price auction with public outside options and zero otherwise. The
term 2=3ðv   wÞ is the linear part of the equilibrium bid in the ﬁrst-price auction with private outside
options and zero in the case without outside options. D is the nonlinear part of the bidding function
with private outside options as deﬁned in Eq. (16) and zero in the case without outside options. The
equation does not contain a constant to make sure that over- or underbidding is only reﬂected in one
parameter. As a result we cannot estimate our ﬁrst mixed effect model where only the constant is
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Table 5
Estimation of Eq. (14) for the A2 and C2 treatment
b






















const. 0 0.0156 4.7325 0.690 0.0000 4.7839 0.848 1.327 0.0000 4.7241 1.257 2.630 0.0002





2 ¼ 0:7551 AIC ¼ 30561:1333 AIC ¼ 30559:8348
C2
const. 0 0.0078 8.8431 1.176 0.0000 8.7566 1.602 3.248 0.0000 8.7111 2.294 5.681 0.0001
v 1 0.0195 0.9233 0.014 0.0000 0.9233 0.014 0.0000 0.9230 0.027 0.065 0.0038





2 ¼ 0:6056 AIC ¼ 43918:1978 AIC ¼ 43823:3168
The table reports estimated ﬁxed effects ^ b
fix:
eff: with their estimated standard deviation ^ s
fix:
b . For the mixed models the table also
includes the estimated standard deviation of the random effects ^ s
rand:
grp: and the estimated residual standard deviation ^ s
rand:
res: .
P-values are for tests against the equilibrium values of the coefﬁcients. As a measure of ﬁt the standard robust effect model
includes R
2 and the mixed effect model Akaike’s Information Criterion AIC. The third column shows p-values for a Wilcoxon
test against the equilibrium values b
eq: (see footnote 9).
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As expected, we see overbidding in the standard case without outside options. The coefﬁcient bA
is signiﬁcantly larger than one. But once public outside options are introduced we observe more
overbidding: The coefﬁcient bB is signiﬁcantly larger than bA.
12 Introducing private outside options
leads to even more overbidding than with public outside options: The coefﬁcient bC is signiﬁcantly
larger than bB.
13 Not only do bidders in the case with private outside options bid more than without
outside options, furthermore they fail to correct for the concavity of the bidding function: The
coefﬁcient bD is signiﬁcantly smaller than one.
14 Since D is always negative a bD which is smaller than
the equilibrium value means again more overbidding. It is possible that the difference in common
knowledge which stems from different types of outside options affects bidding behaviour.
15
When we repeat this exercise for second-price auctions we ﬁnd that overbidding is less affected
by outside options.





C þ u. (18)
Overbidding in second-price auctions has already been observed by Kagel et al. (1987). Also in our
experiment we see a small but signiﬁcant amount of overbidding in the second-price auction.
Introducing outside options in the second-price auction does; however, not further increase
overbidding.
17
To support the observation that outside options affect overbidding in the ﬁrst-price auction but
not in the second-price auction we run the following non-parametric test: For each of the six
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Table 6
First price overbidding depending on the outside option: Estimating Eq. (17)
A1, B1, C1 b
eq: Wilcox. Standard robust model Mixed effect model











bA 1 0.0039 1.0561 0.002 0.0000 1.1115 0.010 0.391 0.0000
bB 1 0.0156 1.1291 0.007 0.0000 1.1526 0.014 0.446 0.0000
bC 1 0.0039 1.2314 0.006 0.0000 1.2111 0.017 0.549 0.0000





2 ¼ 0:9559 AIC ¼ 114664:3254
The table reports estimated ﬁxed effects ^ b
fix:
eff: with their estimated standard deviation ^ s
fix:
b . For the mixed models the table also
includes the estimated standard deviation of the random effects ^ s
rand:
grp: and the estimated residual standard deviation ^ s
rand:
res: .
P-values are for tests against the equilibrium values of the coefﬁcients. As a measure of ﬁt the standard robust effect model
includes R
2 and the mixed effect model Akaike’s Information Criterion AIC. The third column shows p-values for a Wilcoxon
test against the equilibrium values b
eq: (see footnote 9).
12 F1;21 ¼ 4:82, p ¼ 0:0396.
13 F1;21 ¼ 6:72, p ¼ 0:0170.
14 F1;21 ¼ 12:76, p ¼ 0:0018.
15 Gu ¨th and Ivanova-Stenzel (2003) report that the manipulation of common knowledge in asymmetric private value
auctions (competitor’s valuation distribution is known/unknown) ‘‘changes behavior only slightly and hardly ever in
signiﬁcant ways.’’ (p. 198f.) However, it is also possible that the difference in bidding behaviour is not due to differences in
common knowledge, but driven by the symmetry/asymmetry of outside options. Since in our treatments B and C, symmetry
and common knowledge of outside options are different, we cannot conclusively assess the effects of common knowledge
about outside options. We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out to us.
16 For second-price auctions, we deﬁne overbidding as bidding above net valuation. This deﬁnition embodies the standard
notion of overbidding without outside options since then, with an outside option value of zero, the object value coincides with
the net valuation. Due to the fact that, for second-price auctions, the equilibrium bid equals the net valuation, we can
equivalently identify overbids in second-price auctions as bids exceeding equilibrium bids.
17 The coefﬁcient bB is not signiﬁcantly different from bA (F1;13 ¼ 1:22, p ¼ 0:2892).
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and the C1 treatment. If bidders would disregard outside options the test should ﬁnd only a small
number of signiﬁcant differences in the average amount of overbidding among the two treatments.
However, the amount of overbidding is signiﬁcantly larger in the outside options treatment in 63 out
of 72 comparisons (po0:1, two-tailed). When we repeat this exercise with the second-price auctions
A2 and C2, average overbidding is signiﬁcantly larger with outside options in only 6 out of 72
comparisons (po0:1, two-tailed).
4.6. Outside options boost revenue-dominance of ﬁrst-price auction
Based on the payoff equivalence theorem which also applies to the case of outside options the
expected revenue of a ﬁrst-price auction should equal the expected revenue of a second-price
auction. Since the experimental study of Cox et al. (1982) it is well known that, at least in the absence
of outside options, the ﬁrst-price auction generates larger revenues than the second-price auction.
Table 8 shows for all treatments the difference between the expected revenue given the bidding
functions in the lab and the expected revenue in equilibrium.
18 Also in our experiment ﬁrst-price




Treatment Excess revenue Robust ^ s tP 4jtj
A2 Second-price No outside option 1.519887 0.3717887 4.09 0.000
C2 Second-price Private outside option 1.31426 0.9255003 1.42 0.164
A1 First-price No outside option 7.185551 0.5245006 13.70 0.000
B1 First-price Public outside option 10.82654 0.6744602 16.05 0.000
C1 First-price Private outside option 12.36949 0.4828499 25.62 0.000
The table shows average excess revenue (the difference between expected revenue in the lab and the expected revenue with
equilibrium bids).
Table 7
Second-price overbidding depending on the outside option: Estimating Eq. (18)
A2, C2 b
eq: Wilcox. Standard robust model Mixed effect model











bA 1 0.0156 1.0303 0.002 0.0000 1.0234 0.008 0.088 0.0023





2 ¼ 0:9583 AIC ¼ 75802:2927
The table reports estimated ﬁxed effects ^ b
fix:
eff: with their estimated standard deviation ^ s
fix:
b . For the mixed models the table also
includes the estimated standard deviation of the random effects ^ s
rand:
grp: and the estimated residual standard deviation ^ s
rand:
res: .
P-values are for tests against the equilibrium values of the coefﬁcients. As a measure of ﬁt the standard robust effect model
includes R
2 and the mixed effect model Akaike’s Information Criterion AIC. The third column shows p-values for a Wilcoxon
test against the equilibrium values b
eq: (see footnote 9).
18 We determine the expected revenue by evaluating the bidding function for each participant and each period 100 times
for a random valuation and matching the bidder as in the experiment.
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19 and also signiﬁcant among the private outside option
treatments C1 and C2
20. More importantly, the difference in revenue between the ﬁrst-price and the
second-price auction increases when outside options are introduced.
21
4.7. Efﬁciency
In our auction we call an allocation efﬁcient if the object is obtained by the bidder with the
highest net valuation. Since in all treatments bidding functions are monotonic and the same for all
bidders in the net valuation we always have an efﬁcient allocation in equilibrium. Before we did our
experiment we suspected that with outside options the situation is more complex, hence, we would
ﬁnd more inefﬁcient allocations. This, however, does not seem to be the case. The left part of Table 9
shows relative frequencies of efﬁcient allocations for the different treatments. We see that
differences in efﬁciency are small and also not signiﬁcant.
To conﬁrm this ﬁnding we also report mean efﬁciency rates in the right part of the table, i.e. the
ratio of realised total surplus and maximum total surplus. With outside options, realised surplus is
given by the sum of the winner’s surplus and the surplus generated by the outside option available to
the unsuccessful bidder. Again, we see that losses in efﬁciency due to outside options are very small.
5. Conclusion
We have introduced a bidding model that allows for public and private outside option and we
have experimentally tested its properties. A key feature of our experimental design is that we
observe entire bidding functions. We ﬁnd that, in line with the theoretical prediction, higher-valued
outside options lead to less aggressive bidding (i.e. lower bids).
In contrast to the theoretical revenue equivalence of ﬁrst-price and second-price auctions, our
laboratory analysis shows that the ﬁrst-price auction generates more revenue than the second-price
auction. Importantly, outside options signiﬁcantly magnify the revenue-premium of the ﬁrst-price
auction since overbidding in ﬁrst-price auctions is more prominent with outside options than
without. There is no such effect for second-price auctions.
Choosing ﬁrst-price auctions is, hence, more attractive especially when bidders have outside
options.
Our ﬁnding that bidders do not take full advantage of their outside options offers another
explanation for the declining price anomaly. Future auctions in an auction sequence can be viewed as
endogenous outside options. The failure to fully account for outside options, which we observe in our
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Table 9
Relative frequency of efﬁcient allocations
Treatment Relative frequency of
efﬁcient allocations
^ s 95% conf. int. Mean efﬁciency
rate
^ s 95% conf. int.
A2 Second-price 0.876 0.018 0.840 0.911 0.990 0.003 0.983 0.997
C2 Second-price 0.825 0.021 0.784 0.867 0.978 0.004 0.969 0.987
A1 First-price 0.856 0.007 0.841 0.870 0.988 0.001 0.985 0.991
B1 First-price 0.807 0.011 0.784 0.829 0.982 0.002 0.976 0.988
C1 First-price 0.836 0.015 0.805 0.867 0.982 0.003 0.976 0.989
19 F1;35 ¼ 77:66, p ¼ 0:0000.
20 F1;35 ¼ 112:16, p ¼ 0:0000.
21 In the no outside option treatment the revenue-premium of the ﬁrst-price auction is 7:19   1:52 ¼ 5:67ECU while the
introduction of private outside options almost doubles the premium to 12:37   1:31 ¼ 11:06ECU. The difference among the
revenue premia is signiﬁcant, F1;35 ¼ 19:33, p ¼ 0:0001.
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turn, results in a sequence of falling prices.
Taken together, our analysis suggests that outside options crucially inﬂuence bidding behaviour in
a way that is qualitatively predicted by theory. Furthermore we note that the particular nature of
outside options matters.
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Appendix A. List of experimental sessions
Seventeen sessions were conducted at the experimental laboratory at the SFB 504 at the
University of Mannheim in 2003 and 2004; two sessions were conducted at the MaXLab at the
University of Magdeburg in April 2005.
Date Treatment Outside option Auction ECU/Euro Participants
20031211-18:23 A1 None First price 25 14
20031212-10:45 A1 None First price 25 14
20040519-15:53 A1 None First price 35 18
20050414-08:55 A1 None First price 35 20
20050414-13:17 A1 None First price 35 20
20031212-14:23 B1 Public First price 120 18
20031212-15:53 B1 Public First price 120 16
20031212-17:33 B1 Public First price 120 18
20031211-10:19 C1 Private First price 150 16
20031211-12:31 C1 Private First price 150 18
20031211-14:25 C1 Private First price 150 20
20031211-16:17 C1 Private First price 150 18
20041130-17:41 A2 None Second price 35 20
20041201-14:09 A2 None Second price 35 20
20041201-15:57 A2 None Second price 35 18
20041129-10:27 C2 Private Second price 150 20
20041129-15:29 C2 Private Second price 175 16
20041130-10:43 C2 Private Second price 175 18
20041130-15:59 C2 Private Second price 175 18
Appendix B. Conducting the experiment and instructions
Participants were recruited by email and could register for the experiment on the internet.
At the beginning of the experiment participants drew balls from an urn to determine their
allocation to seats. Being seated participants then obtained written instructions in German. These
instructions vary slightly depending on the treatment. In the following we give a translation of the
instructions.
After answering control questions on the screen participants entered the treatment described in
the instructions. After completing the treatment they answered a short questionnaire on the screen
and were then paid in cash. The experiment was conducted with the help of z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007).
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You are participating in a scientiﬁc experiment that is sponsored by the Deutsche Forschungsge-
meinschaft (German Research Foundation). If you read the following instructions carefully then you
can—depending on your decision—gain a considerable amount of money. It is, hence, very important
that you read the instructions carefully.
The instructions that you have received are only for your private information. During the
experiment no communication is permitted. Whenever you have questions, please raise your hand. We
will then answer your question at your seat. Not following this rule leads to the exclusion from the
experiment and all payments.
During the experiment we are not talking about Euro, but about ECU. Your entire income will ﬁrst
be determined in ECU. The total amount of ECU that you have obtained during the experiment will be
converted into Euro at the end and paid to you in cash. The conversion rate will be shown on your
screen at the beginning of the experiment.
B.2. Information regarding the experiment
Today you are participating in an experiment on auctions. The experiment is divided into separate
rounds. We will conduct 12 rounds. In the following we explain what happens in each round.
In each round you bid for an object that is being auctioned. Together with you another participant
is also bidding for the same object. Hence, in each round, there are two bidders. In each round you will
be allocated randomly to another participant for the auction. Your co-bidder in the auction changes
in every round. {The following sentence was only included in the instructions for A1, B1, and C1: The
bidder with the highest bid obtains the object. If bids are the same the object will be allocated
randomly.}
{The following paragraph was only included in the instructions for A2 and C2:
In each round you submit your maximum bid for an object that is auctioned. The maximum bid is
the largest amount that you want to pay for the object. Your co-bidder submits his maximum bid for
the object at the same time as you do. In the auction, the price for the object will be increased in
steps of 0.01 ECU. As soon as the price matches one of both maximum bids (either yours or that of
your co-bidder), the corresponding player stops bidding in the auction. The bidder who remains
alone in the auction obtains the object. Thus, the bidder with the higher maximum bid obtains the
object. The price is equal to the lower maximum bid. In case you or your co-bidder stop bidding at the
same time, the bidder who obtains the object is randomly determined.}
For the auctioned object you have a valuation in ECU. This valuation lies between 50 and 100 ECU
and is randomly determined in each round. From this range you will obtain in each round new and
random valuations for the object. The other bidder in the auction also has a valuation for the object.
The valuation that the other bidder attributes to the object is determined by the same rules as your
valuation and changes in each round, too. All possible valuations of the other bidder are also in the
interval from 50 to 100 from which also your valuations are drawn. All valuations between 50 and
100 are equally likely. Your valuations and those of the other player are determined independently.
You will be told your valuation in each round. You will not know the valuation of the other bidder.
[The following three paragraphs were only included in the instructions for treatments B1,
C1, and C2:
The auction income is calculated as follows:
  {B1 and C1: The bidder with the higher bid obtains the valuation he had for the object in this
auction added to his account minus his bid for the object.} {C2: The bidder who remains alone in
the auction obtains the valuation he had for the object in this auction added to his account minus
the price of the object. The price is given by the smaller one of both maximum bids, i.e. the price
at which one of the bidders stops bidding.}
  {B1: The bidder with the smaller bid obtains a payment that both bidders learn} {C1: The bidder
with the smaller bid obtains a randomly determined payment that he learns} {C2: The bidder that
ARTICLE IN PRESS
O. Kirchkamp et al. / European Economic Review ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]] 18
Please cite this article as: Kirchkamp, O., et al., Outside options: Another reason to choose the
ﬁrst-price auction. European Economic Review (2008), doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.03.005ﬁrst stops bidding in the auction obtains the randomly determined payment that he learns}
before. The determination of this payment is explained further below.
At the beginning of each round, you are informed about the payment {B1: That is obtained
by the bidder who does} {C1, C2: That you obtain if you do} not receive the object in that round.
The value of this payment will be randomly determined and remains constant for four rounds.
Thus, you are assigned a new randomly determined value for the payment after four rounds. {B1: This
payment is identical for you and your co-bidder. For the value of this payment, all values in the range of
0 and 50ECU are equally likely.} {C1, C2: This randomly determined payment can be any value in the
range of 0 and 50ECU with equal probability. Also the other bidder is assigned such a payment. That
will be determined according to the same rules as your payment. You are not informed about the
payment of the other bidder. Your payment and the payment of the other bidder are independent of
one another.}]
B.2.1. Experimental procedure
The experimental procedure is the same in each round and will be described in the following.
Each round in the experiment has two stages.
First stage: In the ﬁrst stage of the experiment you see the following screen
22:
At that stage you do not know your own valuation for the object in this round. {B1: The payment that
the bidder with the smaller bid obtains} {C1, C2: The payment that you obtain if you do not receive
the object} {B1, C1, C2: Is displayed on the screen.} On the right side of the screen you are asked to
enter a {A1, B1, C1: bid} {A2, C2: Maximum bid} for six hypothetical valuations that you might have for
the object. These six hypothetical valuations are 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, and 100ECU. Your input into this
table will be shown in the graph on the left side of the screen when you click on {A1, B1, C1: ‘‘draw
bids’’} {A2, C2: ‘‘draw maximum bids’’}. In the graph the hypothetical valuation is shown on the
horizontal axis, the {A1, B1, C1: Bids} {A2, C2: Maximum bids} are shown on the vertical axis. Your
input in the table is shown as six points in the diagram. Neighbouring points are connected with a line
automatically. These lines determine your fA1;B1;C1 : bidgf A2;C2 : maximum bidg for all valua-
tions between the six points for which you have made an input. For the other bidder the screen in the
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hypothetical valuations. The other bidder cannot see your input.
Second stage: The actual auction takes place in the second stage of each round. In each round we
will play not only a single auction but ﬁve auctions. This is done as follows: Five times a random
valuation is determined that you have for the object. Similarly for the other bidder ﬁve random
valuations are determined. You see the following screen
23:
For each of your ﬁve valuations the computer determines your fA1;B1;C1 : bidgf A2;C2 :
maximum bidg according to the graph from stage 1. If a valuation is precisely at 50, 60, 70, 80, 90,
or 100 the computer takes the fA1;B1;C1 : bidgf A2;C2 : maximum bidg that you entered for this
valuation. If a valuation is between these points your fA1;B1;C1 : bidgf A2;C2 : maximum bidg is
determined according to the joining line. In the same way the fA1;B1;C1 : bidsgf A2;C2 :
maximum bidsg of the other bidder are determined for his ﬁve valuations. fA1;B1;C1: Your bid is
compared with the one of the other bidder. The bidder with the higher bid has obtained the
object.gf A2;C2: In each of the ﬁve auctions the price at which one bidder stops bidding will be
determined from your maximum bid and the maximum bid of your co-bidder. The price is equal to
the smaller one of both maximum bids. The bidder who remains alone in the auction obtains the
object.}
Your income from the auction: For each of the ﬁve auctions the following holds:
  {A1, B1, C1: The bidder with the higher bid gets the valuation he had for the object in this auction
added to his account minus his bid for the object.} {A2, C2: The bidder who remains alone in the
auction gets the valuation he had for the object in this auction added to his account minus the
price of the object. The price is given by the smaller one of both maximum bids, ie. the price at
which one of the bidders stops bidding.}
  {A1: The bidder with the smaller bid obtains no income from this auction.} {B1 and C1: The bidder
with the smaller bid obtains the randomly determined payment that [B1: Is used in this round.]
[C1: He is informed about.]} {A2, C2: That bidder that ﬁrst stops bidding in the auction obtains}
ARTICLE IN PRESS
23 This ﬁgure does not show the bidding function in the graph and the speciﬁc bids, gains and losses that would be shown
during the experiment. Figures are slightly treatment dependent.
O. Kirchkamp et al. / European Economic Review ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]] 20
Please cite this article as: Kirchkamp, O., et al., Outside options: Another reason to choose the
ﬁrst-price auction. European Economic Review (2008), doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.03.005{A2: no income from this auction.} {C2: The randomly determined payment that he is informed
about.}
Your total income in a round is {A1, A2: The sum of the ECU income from those auctions in this
round where} {A1: You have made the higher bid.} {A2: You were the only remaining bidder in the
auction.}
The following box was only included in the instructions for treatments B1, C1, and C2:}
This ends one round of the experiment and you see in the next round again the input screen from
stage 1.
At the end of the experiment your total ECU income from all rounds will be converted into Euro
and paid to you in cash.
Please raise your hand if you have questions.
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